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DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION*
by ISIDOR LOEBt
This symposium is an evidence of the changes that have oc-
curred in the last half century. While Administrative Law has
always existed in this country there was no recognition of it as a
separate branch of law 50 years ago. Though I had previously
taken my degree in Law I do not recall having heard the term
used until 1894, when I was a student under Professor Goodnow
who had just published his treatise on Comparative Administra-
tive Law.
The recognized importance of Administrative Law and Pro-
cedure today is due to the multiplication of administrative agen-
cies. These have become essential parts of our democratic system
in order to enable the people to deal adequately with the com-
plicated problems of our modern social and economic life. Viewed
realistically these agencies have profoundly modified the prin-
ciples of the separation of powers and of a government of laws
and not of men. Nevertheless the necessity for their existence is
admitted by those who, like the speakers of this evening, have an
intelligent understanding of our problems. "Heterodox, at the
beginning of this century, Administrative Law is now an ortho-
dox form of governmental procedure."
Both speakers recognize also that restrictions must be imposed
upon administrative action as well in the public interest as for
the safeguarding of private rights. Finally, there is similar
agreement regarding the statement of fundamental principles
which should govern administrative procedure in order to make
it conform to the constitutional requirements of due process of
law: A fair and adequate hearing before the administrative
agency and an opportunity for judicial determination whether
such hearing has been accorded and whether the authority con-
ferred upon the agency has been respected or exceeded. Differ-
ences appear, however, with respect to the interpretation of these
principles and their application to particular cases.
Primarily concerned with the matter of public interest, Mr.
Feller is naturally opposed to any restrictions which prevent the
* This discussion and those that follow are extemporaneous comments ort
the papers that were delivered at the symposium. Each address is followed
by its correlative discussion.
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efficient dispatch of public business except where these are neces-
sary to prevent impairment of essential private rights. He prop-
erly emphasizes that the issue does not involve New Deal or Anti-
New Deal nor the desirability or undesirability of particular
legislation or of government regulation of business. He is em-
phatic in his opposition to the implications of the Morgan cases
and to the pending Senate Bill proposing to extend the scope of
judicial review of administrative action to findings of fact and
weight of evidence.
Mr. Bikle, on the other hand, strongly supports both of the new
developments as necessary for the safeguarding of private in-
terest. He properly calls attention to the fact that conditions of
appointment and tenure of administrative officials not infre-
quently result in lack of training and competence to deal with
complicated problems. He also suggests that an administrative
authority may become so imbued with what he conceives to be
the legislative purpose that he may overlook or disregard the
mandate of the statute under which he acts. He is unquestion-
ably right in urging the importance of a qualified administrative
personnel, free from political or other influences, and it is to be
regretted that measures for promoting this condition have not
been provided. There is evidence, however, of the development
of an esprit de corps and an absence of numerous cases of arbi-
trary and unethical practices. It must be observed, moreover,
that the method of selection of federal judges does not always
lead to perfect results. It is also true that some judges, as a
result of their training and experience in protecting private
rights, may become so imbued with what they conceive to be the
legislative purpose that they may overlook or disregard the
statutory mandate made in the public interest.
In attempting to evaluate the opposing contentions it is neces-
sary to keep in mind the conditions that have brought about the
,expansion of administrative procedure and the purposes which
it is intended to accomplish. It has been already indicated that
modern social and economic problems made necessary this new
form of control. Administrative authorities were intended to
provide a flexibility in governmental control of private interests
which the three departments of government, acting separately,
could not furnish. In order to prevent arbitrary action and to
.safeguard private interest certain standards of "notice and hear-
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ing," "fairness," "reasonableness," et cetera, were implied or
expressed. In applying these standards to particular cases the
courts should use that type of judicial statesmanship which has
made possible the development of our Constitution so that it
serves the needs of our 20th Century Nation.
We must note, moreover, that this development has not been
unattended with difficulty and obstruction. The interpretation of
the due process clause was influenced by the economic predilec-
tions of certain judges for a considerable period before its proper
connection with modern labor relations and other economic prob-
lems was established. I recall that nearly 30 years ago I joined
with other teachers of Constitutional Law in a published criti-
cism of the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals because
it held a Workmen's Compensation Act invalid as violating due
process. It is not too much to expect or demand that Congress
and the Supreme Court will manifest a statesmanlike attitude
towards this same general provision in dealing with the adminis-
trative mechanism devised to meet imperative needs of our mod-
ern society. As Mr. Feller has so aptly said the procedural
predilections of the judges should not be read into the due pro-
cess clause.
Administrative bodies and their functions and procedures are
of the most diverse character. Some of these created hastily
are doubtless in need of modification and restrictions of their
processes and these should be provided as soon as proper study
reveals the changes that are necessary. But to subject all ad-
ministrative action to uniform and vital restrictions upon pro-
cedures that have been developed during years of controversy is
not only unscientific but would place administration in an arti-
ficial straight jacket which would result in interminable delays,
intolerable public expense and prevent it from meeting the popu-
lar demand which led to its creation.
It should be remembered that, aside from practical difficulties,
many things that are left to administrative discretion could be
dealt with by the legislature directly. Such a legislative act
would encounter no judicial obstacle unless in conflict with some
constitutional principle. So long as administrative authorities
conform to the fundamental principles indicated above, the ju-
diciary should manifest the same self-restraint regarding admin-
istrative action that it indicates controls its review of legislation.
1940]
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Arbitrary action by the administration conflicts with our demo-
cratic ideals and private interest must be safeguarded from this
evil. Administrative inefficiency or ineffectiveness are equally
dangerous and have led to the rise of authoritarian governments.
Fundamental in our democratic system is the protection of in-
dividual rights. Hence individuals in their own interest should
insist upon methods which will make possible that administrative
efficiency without which the democratic system cannot survive
under modern conditions.
by SAM ELSONt
The necessity of having adequate judicial review never struck
me quite as forcibly before as it has tonight after hearing these
two brilliant lectures; for by administrative fiat of the Dean I
am compelled to appear here as one who knows something about
administrative law, although the finding that I was such a person
was made without a prior hearing, without the opportunity to
cross-examine and rebut the finding, and without a scintilla of
evidence or competent testimony. I do want to say this, if I may
be permitted to, because it is so much easier to state these things
in symbols or figures of speech, that Mr. Feller appears here
more or less as a representative of the vested interest of the
government in preserving administrative rule unrestricted by
nasty or irritating judicial interference. And may I characterize
Mr. Bikle as the indignant citizen or the irate taxpaper who pro-
tests because he is not permitted to carry on his business without
some unreasonable restraint by prying governmental agencies.
Now, the surprising feature of these two lectures is this: I
anticipated that Mr. Feller, whom I have first symbolized, would
come here rather apologetic about the numerous attacks that had
been made upon administrative agencies and perhaps prepared
to concede that some features of the bill proposed by the Ameri-
can Bar Association should be accepted, and at the same time
that he might perhaps moderately criticize others. But instead,
I have sensed, despite some calm and deliberate phraseology to
the contrary, that Mr. Feller feels very violently about judicial
interference at this time and has no apologies. In fact I think he
condemns very severely what is happening today, so far as judi-
t Member of St. Louis, Missouri, Bar.
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cial "interference" is concerned, and would have the courts do
even less than they are doing now.
By way of contrast, Mr. Bikle, who, I suppose, has his ears
figuratively pinned back almost every day by administrative
bureaus and should be smarting with continuous indignation, is
rather moderate about the whole thing. He is quite well pre-
pared to accept the existing administrative system with a few
changes, which I think are rather minor, and perhaps without
any material change or increase in the scope of judicial review.
As I gather Mr. Bikle's points, he emphasizes the fact that the
personnel of the administrative bureaus has, to a certain extent,
various weaknesses which call for judicial review of their ac-
tions. Because of these weaknesses, sometimes latent and some-
times in active operation, essential judicial safeguards should be
preserved inviolate, and perhaps strengthened.
But by and large he did not, I think, challenge very much the
existing order, and to my even greater surprise he is content
with less than the American Bar Association is asking. As I
understand Mr. Bikle, he does not agree with the American Bar
Association bill that the regulatory agencies which are given
power to implement statutory policies by rules and regulations
should be required, as the American Bar Association bill pro-
vides, to promulgate rules and regulations within a limited time
-I believe the draft of the bill I saw (there have been so many
drafts) says ninety days, a rather short time and a period which
makes it impossible to proceed with the guidance of experience.
The bill also requires, as a condition precedent before any rules
and regulations are adopted by an agency which has the task of
implementing a statute-implementing the statutes is now a nice
word of art-that the agency shall have public hearings. That
is something the American Bar Association wants. But Mr.
Bikle, who presumably is an irate taxpaper and harried business-
man, does not even want that. And again, I think Mr. Bilde
criticizes the American Bar Association's bill with calmness and
extreme moderation, by pointing out that the bill imposes a cer-
tain rigidity in administrative procedure, at least in so far as it
requires findings by every one of the administrative tribunals
that may fall within its purview, whereas Air. Bikle points out
that the functions of these fifty-odd federal agencies, ranging
from the independent boards like the National Labor Relations
1940] DISCUSSION
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Board to bureaus and department heads, are of many different
varieties and perform many different functions. Mr. Bikle criti-
cizes the American Bar Association bill in requiring that each
and every one of these widely varying administrative bodies,
regardless of their peculiar problems and regardless of the na-
ture and purpose of the particular administrative intervention,
must have a certain rigid type of procedure.
Now, it happens that I agree with Mr. Bikle in both of those
criticisms, but I remark upon them as showing his very evident
moderation in seeking less than his brethren of the American
Bar Association would ask in protecting the interests of Mr.
Bikle's clients.
It is certainly clear to me that the indiscriminate mandatory
application of a uniform procedural method to all officials or
boards possessing administrative and quasi-judicial powers
would not only produce inefficiency and waste, but would in some
instances have nothing short of a paralytic effect on the func-
tioning of several of the agencies. If time were available, it
would not be difficult to illustrate this danger by attempting to
apply the provisions of the American Bar Association bill to the
wide variety of functions and powers now conferred upon the
Securities and Exchange Commission. It would seem that the
statutory requirement of a full or fair hearing before the agency,
fortified by the constitutional requirement of due process, ought
to be ample protection for the private interest. At least this
furnished sufficient ground for the Supreme Court in doing what
it did, and what Mr. Feller complains of, in the Morgan cases.
And in passing, let me say that his criticism of these cases, in
so far as he charges the Supreme Court with specifying the
particular type of administrative procedure which must be fol-
lowed, appears unmerited. The Supreme Court expressly stated
that it was not doing so, nor did it intend to canalize the pro-
cedure, and in fact the main opinion in the second case mentions
several alternative administrative procedures which would have
met the test of a full and fair hearing. I wonder, therefore, if
the criticism does not illustrate a certain feeling of impatience
and hypersensitivity in the administrative agencies when con-
fronted with anything more than nominal judicial review.
Apart from those general observations, I want to give just a
few of what I consider may be practical, though fragmentary,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss3/22
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thoughts in connection with this matter of administrative pro-
cedure. These lectures have to a large extent, I suppose, been
rather philosophic and abstract. They necessarily had to be be-
cause they cover such a large area, the entire realm of adminis-
trative law and agencies. But it occurs to me that possibly a few
practical thoughts, or rather thoughts of my own with reference
to practical or procedural matters, might appropriately be men-
tioned. Before I do that, however, I want to agree with Mr.
Feller in certain general observations he has made. Mr. Feller
made the statement, which I believe is correct, that none of the
new agencies, and by "new" I mean since 1933, has been created
with new "weapons of power" which did not exist in agencies
before the New Deal. I believe he is absolutely right in saying
that, because quite some time ago, being quite interested in the
subject, I made a check of a number of federal statutes and
found, with reference to the points he mentioned, such as the
combination of the investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating
functions, the finality of fact finding by administrative tribunals,
the trial examiner method, the power of administrative bodies
to implement statutes with rules, the power to issue cease-and-
desist orders, the direct judicial review by the circuit courts of
appeals rather than by the district courts, and the elimination
of common law rules of evidence-all of these features, which
many of us assume were simply creations after 1933, existed
before the New Deal.
I believe, on the other hand, that Mr. Feller might well be
criticized for importing certain extraneous issues into the dis-
cussion. For instance, I recall that at the outset of his lecture
he asked us to remove from our minds the prejudice inspired by
political partisanship or antipathy to the policy of the legislation
under consideration. In exemplifying that, Mr. Feller went on to
say that people who like the rulings and decisions of the Federal
Trade Commission are interested in making the Federal Trade
Commission Act effective, whereas people who criticize the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board do not want effective administra-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act. Now I for one chal-
lenge that statement. I do not believe that everybody who criti-
cizes the National Labor Relations Board does so from the
motivation of dislike for the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act and from a desire not to have an effective adminis-
1940]
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tration of the Act. There are quite a number of reputable law-
yers who in good faith challenge some of the decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board, or some of its techniques, not
because they do not want effective administration of the Act, but
simply because they feel that there has not been a fair or full
day in court. In fairness to what Mr. Feller said, he is un-
doubtedly correct in his statement that most people who have
formed prejudices about administrative boards and commissions
in general have done so from their experience with, observation
of, or newspaper reading about the functioning of the National
Labor Relations Board. And to that extent I think their preju-
dices with respect to administrative procedure in general need
give us no serious concern.
The time left is very limited, and you may still be expectant
concerning the observations concerning practical procedure
which I mentioned. I, for one, am not shocked by the elimination
of the traditional common law or statutory rules of evidence from
use before administrative tribunals. I do not think those rules
of evidence are sanctified or absolutely necessary, and their strict
application may well be obstructive in the search for truth in the
administrative arena. Experience shows that except in the cases
of a few administrative bodies or boards like the National Labor
Relations Board, the evidence which goes into the records is
mainly in documentary form. Certainly it is clear, subject to
minor restrictions, that the best evidence rule can well be relaxed.
The hearsay rule, which has been relaxed to the breaking point
even in ordinary judicial proceedings, might well be forgotten
before administrative tribunals, and that problem treated simply
as one of probative value or substantial evidence. I think, how-
ever, that, as Mr. Bikle says, an administrative board ought to be
confined to the record made before it. Not to be bound by the
record evidence in making findings of fact, or to base orders upon
hidden reservoirs of judicial or administrative experience re-
ceived through other channels, which are in no way part of the
particular record, is to conclude a respondent by data which it
has no way of challenging either on review within the adminis-
trative organism or on review by the courts.
There are numerous other comments which deserve to be made
concerning the administrative system in operation, but I have
time only for one other. The fact that the prosecuting and ju-
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dicial functions are often combined in one administrative body
is neither damaging, nor a cause for serious alarm. In actual
operation it has practical advantages which seem, in general, to
over-balance the abuses which sometimes appear. In fact, the
well-established and experienced administrative board will so
divide its functions and personnel as effectively to divorce the
proper bias of the prosecution from the proper detachment of
the hearing and of the trial examiner. Certainly there has been
little complaint or cause for complaint on this score concerning
the functioning of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Federal Trade Commission, and many other similar bodies. It is
unfortunate that in the case of the National Labor Relations
Board the highly controversial nature of the policies expressed
by the Act has given plausibility, if not some justification, for
the criticism.
However, if the combination of the prosecuting and judicial
functions is too shocking to our instincts or belief in the separa-
tion of powers and functions, the problem does not seem difficult
of solution. As the President has so aptly said in another connec-
tion, a short, simple statute could be enacted empowering some
person or body other than the administrative board or bureau to
appoint the trial examiners or other quasi-judicial officers for all
administrative bodies or departments possessing administrative
powers. Thus the power of naming panels could well be vested in
the Circuit Courts of Appeals; and from the panels of experi-
enced officers named by them in each circuit a trial examiner
could be appointed by the administrative board for the particular
hearing. This is but one illustration, though incomplete, of the
manner in which the problem and the charges of bias might be
met.
by J. WESLEY McAFEEt
The subject has been given such thorough discussion tonight
that I intend to restrict myself to suggesting and questioning.
I won't undertake to give the answers. I am glad I haven't time
to try. I don't know them. I think it was very wise of the first
speaker to suggest that it will not do to attack the problem of
administrative law on the basis of particular boards or particu-
Member of St. Louis, Missouri, Bar.
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lar decisions that one does not like. I find it a little hard to
abide by that suggestion, although I think it a proper one. I
have read some opinions of administrative boards recently that
reminded me of the incident of the old lawyer from up home,
who practiced for many years without wearing a tie. He always
wore a collar, but no tie. He finally had a case before the Su-
preme Court of the State, and his friends said, "Sam, when you
get to the Supreme Court you will have to wear a tie." "No,"
he said, "I won't wear a tie. I don't own one, and won't buy one."
He went down to the Supreme Court with his collar, but with-
out his tie. In due course, the Court issued an opinion against
him. He had some acquaintance with the judge who wrote the
opinion, and on the first opportune occasion he went in and spoke
to him. He said, "Judge, I wish you would tell me whether the
fact I didn't have a tie when I made my argument in any way
influenced you in deciding the case against me." The judge said,
"Of course not, Sam. That did not influence me." He said,
"Judge, I am awfully sorry. I am sorry indeed." The judge said,
"Why?" And Sam said, "Because it would have been a much
better reason than any you gave."
The question I have to submit to you is one which might have
been included in Mr. Feller's paper. I am sure that it won't be
regarded as an inhospitable criticism but rather as a compliment
that I should have liked for him to have felt free to take time
to discuss it. It is this: To what extent is the public interest
affected by fundamental limitations upon the power of adminis-
trative bodies? And to give only briefly an illustration of what
I am trying to say, I want to know whether the public interest
will really be served by abandoning limitations on the delegation
of power that have existed so long in our law.
We have always thought that legislative power might not be
delegated unless there be first established a standard, and that
findings be made upon which to base action in conformity with
the standard. Now, many of the statutes on administrative law
seem to me to provide no standard, or at least a standard so hazy
as to amount to no standard. I think of Section 9B of the Labor
Act, in dealing with the selection of an appropriate bargaining
unit. I think of the Wage-Hour law, in which the only limitation
that I can find upon an administratively-prescribed wage depart-
ing from the statutory wage is that it shall not cause unemploy-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss3/22
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ment. That is like saying that it shall create prosperity; a pur-
pose so general and hazy as to not be a standard.
Has the time come when the public interest can be said to
demand such broad powers? I am not talking about private in-
terests, for which the second speaker spoke; I am talking of the
public. I have no private and personal interest which will be
affected by administrative bodies; I am sorry I have not reached
that stage of importance. Still I am interested in the problem.
I think I have a right to be interested in it. And do I not have
a right to consider from my own viewpoint, as a member of the
public, whether it is good for us as a people to abandon those
principles of government that long experience has shown to be
so valuable to us?
Without undertaking to answer the question, because of the
lateness of the hour and lack of ability to do so, I invite your
thought on that proposition.
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